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THE
GROWING DEMAND FOR EQUAL TREATMENT OF MENTAL AND
PHYSICAL ILLNESSES IN INSURANCE POLICIES, AND WHAT
IT MEANS TO EMPLOYERS
By: Bruce S. Harrison
W.
Robert Donovan, Jr.
"This
article was originally published in Matthew Bender's,
Employment Law Bulletin."
I. INTRODUCTION
More
than 5 percent of American adults have a serious mental
illness; and 23 percent suffer from a diagnosed mental
illness in a given year.
[i]
Major depression, bipolar disorder, schizophrenia
and obsessive-compulsive disorder are four of the leading ten
causes of disability in the United States.
[ii]
Psychiatric admissions accounted for 25.8
percent of all hospital admissions in 1998.
[iii]
Nor surprisingly given this background, in
1990, $69 billion was spent on treatment and rehabilitation for
mental disorders.
[iv]
Statistics
such as those cited above are used by both sides in a growing
debate about whether mental and physical illnesses should
be accorded equal treatment in employment benefits. The
impact of the answer could be substantial as health and
disability insurance policies have historically provided
lower benefits for mental as opposed to physical impairments. The insurance industry asserts that insurance
premiums and health care costs will skyrocket if these
lower limits on mental health benefits are now lifted.
On
the other side, mental health advocates argue that the
benefits of providing equal coverage for mental and physical
impairments far outweigh the costs. They assert that parity will result in more
people with mental illnesses seeking treatment, and becoming
more productive and healthy members of society. And,
they contend, more coverage will not result in the significant
premiums projected by the insurance industry.
This
debate has resulted in recent action in all three branches
of the government. In the courts, there have been a number of
claims filed under the Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA"), challenging disparities in coverage
between mental and physical health conditions in insurance
policies. In Congress,
the Mental Health Parity Act was passed in 1996. That Act, which took effect in 1998, is a
compromise between the competing concerns voiced by the
insurance and mental health lobbies. Additionally,
other bills requiring parity in benefits are pending in
Congress and at least thirty-one states have laws requiring,
to some degree, parity of benefits.
[v]
This is an issue that transcends traditional
political lines. Thus,
on April 30, 2002, President Bush went on the record supporting
measures to eliminate this disparity in benefits.
[vi]
Below,
we discuss the Mental Health Parity Act and Americans with
Disabilities Act as they apply to these issues.
II. THE MENTAL HEALTH PARITY ACT
III. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
Title
I of the ADA makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate "against
a qualified individual with a disability because of the
disability of such individual in regard to . . .hiring,
. . .employee compensation, . . .and other terms, conditions,
and privileges of employment."
[xvii]
Employees with mental disabilities have sued
their employers under Title I concerning employer-sponsored health
and disability insurance policies that provide lower benefits
for mental illnesses than for physical illnesses.
Courts
that have addressed these claims have overwhelmingly held
that insurance policies that provide different levels of
benefits for mental versus physical disabilities do not
violate the ADA.
[xviii]
One reason for this is because, many courts
have held, "the ADA does not mandate equality between individuals
with different disabilities. Rather,
the ADA prohibits discrimination between the disabled and the
non-disabled. . ."
[xix]
Because the ADA suits have been predicated
on disparities between two different classes of disabled individuals those
with mental impairments versus those with physical impairments the
ADA is not implicated. Put
another way, as long as individuals with mental disabilities
have the same access to benefits as other employees, no discrimination
has occurred.
[xx]
A
few courts have disagreed with the contention that the
ADA only prohibits discrimination against disabled individuals
versus non-disabled individuals. In the main, they have relied on a recent
decision by the United States Supreme Court, Olmstead
v. L.C.,
[xxi]
for their contention that the ADA also prohibits
discrimination between individuals with different types of disabilities.
[xxii]
These courts reason that the issue is whether
the individual was discriminated against "because of the disability
of such individual," and the answer to this question cannot be
determined simply by looking at how the individual is treated
as compared to non-disabled individuals. Instead,
one must consider how the individual was treated as compared
to individuals with other types of disabilities.
Another
reason why persons challenging disparities in insurance
coverage for mental versus physical conditions have been
unsuccessful is that the plaintiffs are often not qualified
to perform their old jobs. To
bring a claim under the ADA, an individual must be able
to show that she is able to perform the essential functions
of her job, with or without a reasonable accommodation.
[xxiii]
When an individual suffering from a mental
disability brings a claim alleging that she is being discriminated
against because her long-term disability benefits ended sooner
than the benefits would have ended if she was suffering from
a physical disability, she is basically saying she is still totally
disabled and entitled to more benefits. Many courts have held that this proves the
individual cannot perform the essential functions of the job,
and therefore is not protected by the ADA.
[xxiv]
The
latter argument is not universally accepted. A
number of courts have held to the contrary, relying on
the Supreme Court's decision in Robinson v. Shell Oil
Co.
[xxv]
There, the Court ruled that Title VII applies
to former, as well as current, employees. Some
courts have held that Robinson extends to the ADA, and
to former employees who are no longer able to perform the essential
functions of their jobs.
[xxvi]
They find support for that position in the
similar definitions of "employee" under Title VII and
the ADA, as well as the fact that the ADA prohibits discrimination
in post-employment benefits.
[xxvii]
This, they contend, shows that the ADA was
meant to apply to ex-employees. Other
courts have ruled that Robinson should not be extended
to the ADA.
[xxviii]
Another
reason courts have held that the ADA does not protect against
disparate levels of benefits for mental versus physical
disabilities is Congress' recent enactment of the Mental
Health Parity Act ("MHPA").
[xxix]
Essentially, these courts reason that if Congress
meant for the ADA to make such disparities unlawful they would
not have seen a need to pass the MHPA.
[xxx]
This view has also been disputed, by courts
holding that the ADA applies to people with disabilities, while
the MHPA applies to a much broader category of illnesses those
who are and who are not disabled.
[xxxi]
From this they discern that the MHPA was passed
to "take action against non-disability based forms of discrimination
even if the ADA already regulated disability-based distinctions
in the content of fringe benefits."
[xxxii]
Finally,
in ruling that these policies do not violate the ADA, many
courts have pointed to the ADA's "safe harbor," which
exempts employers from liability for a bona fide benefit
plan, provided the safe harbor is not used as a "subterfuge
to evade the purposes of" the ADA.
[xxxiii]
Bona fide simply means that the plan "exists
and pays benefits, and that its terms have been accurately communicated
to covered employees."
[xxxiv]
The "not a subterfuge" test has been given
at least three different interpretations.
The
EEOC contends that the safe harbor is being used as a subterfuge
unless the employer can show that a disability-based distinction
in a benefit plan is based on sound actuarial principles,
or on actual or reasonably anticipated claims experience
that coverage of the disability would create an intolerable
and unsustainable financial strain upon the assets of the
plan.
[xxxv]
This interpretation, however, has received
little support from the courts.
[xxxvi]
Instead
of requiring the employer to show reliance on actuarial
data or claims experience to fall within the safe harbor,
most courts will find that the safe harbor is being used
as a subterfuge only when the employee can establish that
the employer "intended, by virtue of the plan, to discriminate
[based on disability] in a non-fringe-benefit-related aspect
of the employment relation."
[xxxvii]
To meet this definition of subterfuge, an
employee would have to show that she was subject to employment
discrimination outside the plan, or that the plan's exclusion
somehow adversely affected the employee in some non-fringe-benefit
context.
[xxxviii]
Obviously, this is a very difficult burden
to meet.
At
least one court has interpreted the "subterfuge" provision
to mean that, while an employee will need to show "that
the employer specifically intended to discriminate based
on disability," the employee will not have to show that
the employer intended to discriminate in a non-fringe-benefit-related
aspect of the employment relation.
[xxxix]
However, the court further held that evidence
that the employer "did not rely on an objective cost-justification
approach" in setting the lower limits for mental illnesses, "would
not of itself suffice to carry [the plaintiff's] burden of establishing
that [the employer] specifically intended to evade the ADA's
anti-discrimination mandate."
[xl]
Therefore, even under this test, the burden
on the employee is significant.
While
not always agreeing on all of the above contentions, seven
of the eight United States Circuit Court of Appeals that
have addressed this issue have ruled that, as a matter
of law, insurance policies or plans that provide more benefits
for physical than for mental illnesses do not violate the
ADA.
[xli]
Only the Eleventh Circuit has ruled that such
a policy could violate the ADA, and since then the opinion has
been vacated.
[xlii]
Moreover, while ruling that such policies
may violate the ADA, the Court agreed that the plaintiff would
still have to show that the employer specifically intended to
discriminate based on disability, making it very difficult for
a plaintiff to win such a claim.
[i]
National Alliance for the
Mentally Ill, Facts & Figures About Mental Illness,
(http://www.nami.org/fact.htm).
[iv]
Id. (also stating
that "the indirect costs (lost productivity at
work, school, or home due to disability or death) were
estimated at $78.6 billion.").
[v]
James Gerstenzang and Vicki
Kemper, Mental Health Parity Urged, L.A. Times,
April 30, 2002 at http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-043002mental.story.
[vii]
The law defines "aggregate
lifetime limits" as "a dollar limitation
on the total amount that may be paid with respect to
such benefits under the plan or health insurance coverage
with respect to an individual or other coverage unit." 42
U.S.C. ß 300gg-5(e)(1). "Annual
limit" has an identical definition, but is limited
to "benefits in a 12-month period." 42 U.S.C. ß 300gg-5(e)(2).
[viii]
42 U.S.C. ß 300gg-5(a).
[ix]
The term "group health plan" is
given the same definition as "employee welfare benefit
plan" as defined by ERISA. 29
U.S.C. ß 300gg-91. Employee
welfare benefit plan is defined by ERISA to include "any
plan. . .established or maintained by an employer for
an employee. . .to the extent that such plan. . .was
established or is maintained for the purpose of providing
for its participants. . .through the purchase of insurance
or otherwise," medical benefits. 29 U.S.C. ß 1002. This has been interpreted to apply to employer
self-insured plans.
[x]
42 U.S.C. ß 300gg-5(b)(1).
[xi]
42 U.S.C. ß 300gg-5(e)(4)
(italics supplied).
[xiii]
42 U.S.C. ß 300gg-5(b)(2).
[xv]
42 U.S.C. ß 300gg-5(c).
[xvi]
42 U.S.C. ß 300gg-5(f).
[xviii]
See, e.g., EEOC
v. Staten Island Savings Bank, 207 F.3d 144, 148
(2nd Cir. 2000)("Title I of the ADA does not bar
[employers] from offering" long-term disability
benefit plans that provide less coverage for mental
and emotion disabilities than for physical disabilities); Ford
v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 608-10
(3rd Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093, 119 S.
Ct. 850, 142 L. Ed. 2d 704 (1999); Lewis v. Kmart
Corp., 180 F.3d 166, 170 (4th Cir. 1999), cert.
denied, 145 L. Ed. 2d 929, 120 S. Ct. 978 (2000); Parker
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1015-19
(6th Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1084,
139 L. Ed. 2d 768, 118 S. Ct. 871 (1998); EEOC v.
CNA Ins. Cos., 96 F.3d 1039, 1044-45 (7th Cir.
1996); Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.,
198 F.3d 1104, 1116-18 (9th Cir. 2000); Kimber v.
Thiokol Corp., 196 F.3d 1092, 1101-02 (10th Cir.
1999).
[xix]
Parker, 121 F.3d at
1015; see also Weyer, 198 F.3d at 1116-17; CNA
Ins. Cos., 96 F.3d at 1044; Lewis,
180 F.3d at 171-72; Ford, 145 F.3d at 608.
[xx]
Staten Island Savings
Bank, 207 F.3d at 150 ("'so long as every employee
is offered the same plan regardless of that employee's
contemporary or future disability status, then no discrimination
has occurred even if the plan offers different coverage
for various disabilities.'")(quoting Ford,
145 F.3d at 608; also citing Weyer, 198
F.3d at 1116; Kimber, 196 F.3d at 1101-02; Parker,
121 F.3d at 1015-16; CNA Ins. Co., 96 F.3d at
1044-45).
[xxi]
527 U.S. 581, 119 S. Ct.
2176, 2186, 144 L. Ed. 2d 540 (1999).
[xxii]
Staten Island Savings
Bank, 207 F.3d at 151 (while agreeing that "the
ADA generally affords 'individualized protection' against
illegal conduct within its reach," the court noted
that the Supreme Court in Olmstead "reject[ed]
view that ADA requires no more than evenhanded treatment
between the disabled and non-disabled"); Johnson
v. Kmart Corp., 12 AD Cases 801, 813-814 (11th
Cir. 2001), vacated and rehearing, en banc, granted,
273 F.3d 1035 (2001)(holding that Olmstead stands
for the proposition that different treatment of mental
versus physical disabilities is unlawful discrimination
under the ADA); Boots v. Northwestern Mutual Life
Ins. Co., 77 F.Supp.2d 211, 218 (D. N.H. 1999)(citing Olmstead,
the Court noted that "the Supreme Court has just
rejected the argument that disparate treatment of different
members of a protected class is not discrimination").
[xxiii]
See 42 U.S.C. ß 12112(a)(prohibiting
discrimination against "a qualified individual
with a disability"); and 42 U.S.C. ß 12111(8)(defining "qualified
individual with a disability" as a disabled individual
who "with or without reasonable accommodation,
can perform the essential functions of the employment
position that such individual holds or desires.").
[xxiv]
See, e.g., Weyer,
198 F.3d at 1108-13 (citing CNA Ins. Cos.,
96 F.3d 1039; Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
99 F.3d 181, 185 (6th Cir. 1996), rev'd
on other grounds, 121 F.3d 1006 (6th Cir.
1997); Beauford v. Father Flanagan's Boys' Home,
831 F.2d 768 (8th Cir. 1987)(same holding
under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act the precursor
to the ADA); Gonzales v. Garner Food Svs., 89
F.3d 1523, 1531 (11th Cir. 1996)).
[xxv]
519 U.S. 337, 136 L. Ed.
2d 808, 117 S. Ct. 843 (1997).
[xxvi]
See, e.g., Castellano v. City of New York,
142 F.3d 58, 68 (2nd Cir. 1998) ("An interpretation that would prevent former employees
who are no longer "qualified individuals" from
bringing claims of discrimination in the provision
of post-employment fringe benefits would also undermine
the plain purpose of sections 12112(a) and (b)(2):
to provide comprehensive protection from discrimination
in the provision of fringe benefits."); Ford, 145 F.3d at 607 (interpreting Title I "to allow
disabled former employees to sue their former employers
regarding their disability benefits so as to effectuate
the full panoply of rights guaranteed by the ADA."); Johnson,
12 AD Cases at 806-10 (overruling its earlier decision Gonzales
v. Garner Food Svs. (supra fn. xxiv) in light
of the Supreme Court's ruling in Robinson.).
[xxviii]
See Weyer,
198 F.3d at 1111-12; Morgan v. Joint Admin. Bd.,
268 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. 2001)(in reaffirming
its opinion in CNA (supra at fn. xviii), the
Court rejected the argument that Robinson should
apply to the ADA).
[xxix]
See Parker,
121 F.3d at 1017-18; Weyer, 198 F.3d at 1117; Ford, 145 F.3d at 610; see also CNA,
96 F.3d at 1044 (decided prior to the enactment of
the MHPA, but addressing a prior, similar, bill which
was defeated.
[xxx]
See Parker,
121 F.3d at 1018 ("Congress' passage of the Mental
Health Parity Act suggests Congress believed that the
ADA neither governs the content of insurance policies
nor requires parity between physical and mental illness.")
[xxxi]
Boots, 77 F.Supp.2d
at 220, Staten Island Savings Bank, 207 F.3d
at 152.
[xxxii]
Staten Island Savings
Bank, 207 F.3d at 152.
[xxxiv]
EEOC Interim Enforcement
Guidance.
[xxxv]
EEOC's Interim Enforcement
Guidance (in which the EEOC contends that the following
situations would constitute an "intolerable financial
strain:" a) continued unlimited coverage of that group
of disabilities would be so expensive as to cause the
health insurance plan to become financially insolvent,
and there was no non-disability-based plan alterative
that would avoid insolvency; b) "a drastic increase
in premium payments (or in co-payments or deductibles),
or a drastic alteration to the scope of coverage or
level of benefits provided, that would: 1) make the health insurance plan effectively
unavailable to a significant number of other employees,
2) make the health insurance plan so unattractive
as to result in significant adverse selection, or 3) make the health insurance so unattractive
that the employer could not compete in recruiting and
maintaining qualified workers due to the superiority
of health insurance plans offered by other employers
in the community.").
[xxxvi]
Carparts Distrib. Ctr. v. Automotive
Wholesaler's Ass'n, 987 F. Supp. 77 (D. N.H. 1997)(holding that concern that a disability
would create an intolerable and unsustainable financial
drain, and an unjustifiable insurance risk, is sufficient
reason to change the policy); Cloutier v. Prudential
Ins. Co., 964 F. Supp. 299 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (the employer must show that the individual
presents an uninsurable risk).
[xxxvii]
See, e.g., Leonard F. v. Israel Discount
Bank,
199 F.3d 99, 103-04 (2nd Cir. 1999); Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Medical
Center,
95 F.3d 674, 678-79 (8th Cir. 1996); Ford, 145 F.3d at 610-12; Modderno v. King,
82 F.3d 1059, 1064-65 (D.C. Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
519 U.S. 1094, 136 L.Ed. 2d 717, 117 S. Ct. 772 (1997). These
courts applied the U.S. Supreme Court's definition
of subterfuge as it appears in the ADEA.
[xxxix]
Johnson, 12 AD Cases
at 818.
[xli]
Compare cases cited supra
at fn. xviii with Johnson v. Kmart, supra at
fn. xxii.
[xlii]
273 F.3d 1035 (2001)(vacating
the Johnson v. Kmart decision, and granting
a rehearing, en banc). Subsequently,
in light of Kmart's bankruptcy filing, the Court ruled
that it would not issue a decision in the case "until
the bankruptcy court grants relief from the automatic
stay or the stay lapses." 281
F.3d 1368 (2002).
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