E-MAIL AND ETHICS IN DISCOVERY

By Bruce S. Harrison

Fiona W. Ong


This article was originally published in Matthew Bender's, Employment Law Bulletin.

Introduction

Microsoft. Enron. These names bring visions of corporate giants brought low by their Achilles heel – e-mail and other computer evidence.
In our society today, e-mail has become a means of casual conversation and easy communication. People think nothing of typing and sending a quick joke, a thought, or a comment. All too frequently as individuals, we fail to consider the fact that e-mail, unlike the ephemeral nature of conversation, has a life of its own. Businesses are now facing the realities of the power of e-mail in litigation, both good and bad.
This article discusses some of the ways in which e-mail can be utilized in employment (and other) litigation. It also discusses some of the ethical concerns facing attorneys in handling the discovery process with regard to e-mail.

Discovery of E-mail

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generally provide that "Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action . . ." [i] Over the years, the Rules have been amended in recognition of the technological changes in business practices.

In both Rules 26 (governing the scope of discovery and disclosure obligations) and 34 (regarding the production of documents), "data compilations" were added to the lists of types of documents that may be obtained through discovery. [ii] The Advisory Committee notes to Rule 26 observe that "the disclosure should describe and categorize . . . the nature and location of potentially relevant documents and records, including computerized data and other electronically-recorded information, . . ." [iii] The Advisory Committee notes to Rule 34 provide further illumination as to the scope of such "data compilations":

The inclusive description of "documents" is revised to accord with changing technology. It makes clear that Rule 34 applies to electronic data compilations from which information can be obtained only with the use of detection devices, and that when the data can as a practical matter be made usable by the discovering party only through respondent's devices, respondent may be required to use his devices to translate the data into usable form. In many instances, this means that respondent will have to supply a print-out of computer data. The burden thus placed on respondent will vary from case to case, and the courts have ample power under Rule 26(c) to protect respondent against undue burden or expense, either by restricting discovery or requiring that the discovering party pay costs. Similarly, if the discovering party needs to check the electronic source itself, the court may protect respondent with respect to preservation of his records, confidentiality of nondiscoverable matters, and costs.

Thus, the Rules recognize not only the discoverability of e-mail and other computerized evidence, but also that there are significant complications that may arise in the course of such discovery. These complications can involve both practical matters (e.g. costs and logistics of production, etc.) as well as ethical ones (e.g. ensuring production of all relevant information, protecting privileged or confidential information, etc.).

E-mail as Evidence in Employment Litigation

As one commentator has noted, e-mail issues arise most frequently in the employment context. [iv] This commentator also notes that the number of employment cases involving e-mail was about twice the number of cases in any other category, and that the total number of cases is expected to rise dramatically. [v]

In the context of employment disputes, e-mails can serve as evidence to be used as a sword by employees or a shield by employers.

E-mails can serve as the basis (in whole or in part) for a harassment claim by an employee. Such claims can involve the content of the e-mail. For example, in Knox v. Indiana, [vi] an employee brought suit for sexual harassment. Repeated e-mail messages from her supervisor, asking her for sex, were critical pieces of evidence.

A claim of harassment can also involve the number of e-mails that are sent to the employee. For example, in Greenslade v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., [vii] the plaintiff's sexual harassment claim was based, in part, on the excessive number of e-mails that were sent by a co-worker.

Similarly, e-mails can evidence discriminatory attitudes or intent against an employee. In Strauss v. Microsoft Corp., [viii] the court permitted the plaintiff to use e-mail with sexual references as evidence showing gender discrimination.

On the other hand, employers may use e-mails to demonstrate employee misconduct. For example, in Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., [ix] the court found that the plaintiff had no claim for wrongful termination where he was fired for sending inappropriate e-mails over the company's e-mail system.

In addition, employers may rely on e-mail evidence to support a defense against employment discrimination claims. As the Supreme Court has recognized, the promulgation and dissemination of effective anti-discrimination and harassment policies is a significant part of an employer's defense to such claims. [x] E-mail can provide an effective and efficient way to communicate such policies to all employees. Secondly, the fact of the communication itself is documented in the e-mail. Consequently, employees will find it more difficult to argue that they did not have knowledge or notice of the policies. For example, in Idusuyi v. Tenn. Dept. of Children's Servs., [xi] the court found that the employer had effectively communicated its anti-harassment policy to its employees when it disseminated the policy through a computer server, sent the policy to its employees by e-mail, and posted it on a board.

Finally, the use of e-mail itself can be part of an employee's job duties or function. In Farmer v. Continental Ins. Co., [xii] the court found that the employee had been properly terminated where she did not perform her daily duty to check her e-mail "in a timely manner.

Ethical Issues

The discoverability of e-mail gives rise to a number of ethical considerations on the part of counsel. These involve the scope of the production, as well as its substance. Failure to abide by these ethical obligations may give rise to disciplinary measures against the attorneys. For example, in Cobell v. Bruce Babbitt, [xiii] the court found that government attorneys failed to timely and accurately inform the court and the opposing party of the destruction of documents that were responsive to the opposing party's discovery requests. The court specifically found that the attorneys were guilty of violating the Rules of Professional Conduct, and should be subjected to disciplinary or corrective action.

Retention of Relevant Evidence

The American Bar Association's ("ABA") Model Rules of Professional Conduct provide that "A lawyer shall not . . . unlawfully obstruct another's access to evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a document or other material having potential evidentiary value. A lawyer shall not counsel or assist another person to do any such act . . ." [xiv]

There are several issues associated with records retention. First, it is important for a company to have an effective records retention policy. It is not efficient to simply retain all documents, even those in electronic format. This can absorb significant resources for storage. In addition, the greater the number of documents stored, the more difficult it becomes to keep them organized and accessible.

Second, without a records retention policy, employees may inadvertently engage in haphazard retention and/or destruction of documents.

Further, a reasonable retention policy that permits the timely destruction of old documents will lessen the discovery burden on a company in litigation ­ if there are only two years of e-mail to sort through, that is obviously a smaller task than if every e-mail ever sent or received by the company has been retained.

Whatever retention policy is implemented, it must be sufficiently flexible to deal with litigation needs. Obviously, once litigation has commenced, it is imperative that any destruction of computerized data that occurs in the normal course of business must be suspended. Failure to do so can result in serious consequences. For example, in William T. Thompson Co. v. General Nutrition Corp., [xv] the defendant, GNC, deleted electronic records that were being sought by the plaintiff. The data on these records was not otherwise available, and the records could not be recreated. The Court found that GNC knew or should have known that the records were relevant to the litigation and that GNC had been ordered to preserve these records. GNC, however, did not instruct its employees to preserve the records; rather, it stated that its standard document retention and destruction procedures should continue. As a result, the Court sanctioned GNC by striking its Answer to the plaintiff's Complaint, entering a default judgment for the plaintiff, and striking GNC's Complaint in a related case.

Waiver of Privilege

All attorneys are subject to an ethical duty to protect their client's legally confidential information. Thus, attorneys must be careful not to disclose materials that are subject to either the attorney-client privilege or the work-product doctrine.

With respect to the attorney-client privilege, the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct provide in relevant part that "A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation to representation of a client, unless the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation . . ." [xvi]

As for the work-product doctrine, it is set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. [xvii] This doctrine protects materials that are prepared in anticipation of litigation or trial, either by a party or a party's representative.

There are a number of problems involved in the observance of these ethical obligations, arising from the nature of e-mail itself. First is the sheer volume of e-mail that is generated in the normal course of business, even for a small company. Second is the typical absence of any filing or management mechanism, meaning that business communications are intermingled with personal ones. Third is the fact that people tend to use more casual language in e-mail communications, even for business discussions.

These characteristics of e-mail render a privilege review a daunting task. The vast numbers of e-mail make the prospect of a page-by-page (or screen-by-screen) review a mind-numbing, if not impossible project based on time and cost. Programs that are designed to filter e-mails based on specific words may miss e-mails based on the sender's word choice or spelling. Pulling the e-mails from or to an attorney may not be difficult, but tracking other in-house discussions of that information may be. Similarly, identifying information that is protected by the work-product doctrine may also be difficult.

Nonetheless, a privilege review must be conducted with care. The consequences of an inadvertent production of privileged information can be dire. In United States v. Keystone Sanitation Co., [xviii] a party inadvertently produced two e-mails between its lawyers discussing their billing statements. The court held that the inadvertent disclosure waived the attorney-client privilege.

There are a number of steps that the company and counsel can take to protect the privilege. As a broad-scale solution, a company should implement some sort of management system to segregate privileged material from the remaining e-mails. Once the company is in litigation, counsel should be careful to ensure that the reviewing process is as thorough as possible. As an additional precaution, it may be wise to come to an agreement with opposing counsel that inadvertent disclosures of privileged e-mail does not waive the privilege.

Trade Secret and Confidential Information

An attorney has the obligation to protect his client's interests during the course of his representation. The Preamble to the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct notes that a lawyer is the representative of his clients, and that he "zealously asserts the client's position. As practitioners, we have repeatedly heard the directive that we must put our client's interests ahead of all else. In this regard, it is critical that an attorney be careful to protect the client's trade secrets and confidential business information.

For the same reasons discussed with regard to the protection of privileged information, the protection of trade secrets and confidential business information is problematic. In fact, it may be even more difficult to identify such e-mails than privileged ones, given that the subject matter cannot be distinguished on the basis of the discussion of legal, rather than business, matters, or the involvement of attorneys.

Steps similar to those discussed above regarding privileged materials may be taken to protect trade secret and confidential information. Again, a filing or management system for e-mails could segregate out such sensitive communications. A thorough review will still need to be conducted. In addition, it may be wise to enter into a joint confidentiality agreement with opposing counsel or seek a confidentiality order from the court to ensure non-disclosure of this information.

Full Disclosure of Relevant Evidence

Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party is entitled to discover "relevant" evidence. [xix] The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct also provide that an attorney shall not "in pretrial procedure, . . . fail to make reasonably diligent effort to comply with a legally proper discovery request by an opposing party." [xx] In other words, an attorney's ethical obligation is to produce all data that is relevant to a claim or defense.

The principle is simple; the execution, with regard to e-mail and other computerized data, is not. Logistically, the data on the computer system or back-up system (e.g. tapes, disks, etc.) may not be readily accessible. The company may have undergone a system conversion, and data under the prior system may not be accessible or readable. There may be more than one location (e.g. file, computer, system) where the data is retained. Overwritten files may still be recoverable. Data may not be backed up or archived in any sort of organizational fashion.

Attorneys and their clients who fail to meet this obligation may face serious consequences. For example, in Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Craig, [xxi] the court sanctioned the defendant because the defendant failed to disclose or produce computer data that was inaccessible at the time of the initial request, but later became accessible. The court prohibited the defendant from using any evidence on its defense, leading to a default judgment against the defendant.

The Use of Experts

An attorney also has ethical obligations with respect to any experts that he retains to review or work with e-mails and computerized data. The ABA Model Rules provide, in detail, that:

With respect to a nonlawyer employed or retained by or associated with a lawyer:

(a) a partner in a law firm shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that the person's conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer;

(b) a lawyer having direct supervisory authority over the nonlawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the person's conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer; and

(c) a lawyer shall be responsible for conduct of such a person that would be a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct if engaged in by a lawyer if:

(1) the lawyer orders or, with the knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; or

(2) the lawyer is a partner in the law firm in which the person is employed, or has direct supervisory authority over the person, and knows of the conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action. [xxii]

Thus, an attorney has significant responsibility for the actions of his experts, whether working with the company's electronic data or that of the opposing party.

In many instances, an attorney may hire an expert to go through the data produced by the opposing party. The attorney should take steps to ensure that the expert will not accidentally damage the integrity of the other party's computer data or system. For example, in Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., [xxiii] the plaintiff's expert examined an individual computer, using a program that randomly erased 7-8% of the otherwise available data.

With regard to production of the company's electronic communications in response to discovery requests from the opposing party, it may be necessary to retain an expert to develop systems to sort and manage the e-mail. Under such circumstances, the attorney should ensure that the expert complies with ABA Model Rule 3.4 and does not "alter, destroy or conceal" any data.


Reasonable Requests for Discovery

Under the ABA Model Rules, an attorney should not "in pretrial procedure, make a frivolous discovery request . . ." [xxiv] As discussed above, responding to a request for e-mail records can be a hugely burdensome task.Attorneys should be cognizant of those burdens in drafting discovery requests.For example, where possible, requests could be limited to seeking the e-mail of certain individuals or e-mails transmitted during a limited time period. Requests that are deemed to be overly burdensome will not be enforced by a court. For example, in Fennell v. First Step Designs, Ltd., [xxv] the court refused the plaintiff's discovery request for all files stored on a computer hard drive.Although the court acknowledged that such discovery could be appropriate in some cases, it was not in that case because the plaintiff failed to show a particularized likelihood that appropriate information could be discovered.

The ABA Model Rules also provide that "A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client." [xxvi] In keeping with this ethical obligation, along with considerations of professional courtesy, an attorney should attempt to work with opposing counsel to develop procedures and protocols for dealing with the discovery of e-mail and other computerized data. This may involve entering into agreements regarding certain limits on the scope of the e-mail review, as well as preserving privilege for inadvertent disclosures, or keeping confidentiality as to trade secret and confidential business information.

Conclusion

The issues associated with the discovery of electronic communications and other computerized data can be complex, and the ramifications of failing to understand those issues can be severe, not just for the client, but also for the attorney on a professional basis.Attorneys must be aware of how their ethical obligations shift and change with the rapidly changing technologies in our society.

"This article was originally published in Matthew Bender's, Employment Law Bulletin."



[i] Fed. R. Civ. Proc. Rule 26(b)(1).

[ii] Fed. R. Civ. Proc. Rule 34; Fed. R. Civ. Proc. Rule 26(a)(1), 1993 amendments.

[iii] Fed. R. Civ. Proc. Rule 26.

[iv] Thumma, Samuel and Jackson, Darrel, "The History of Electronic Mail in Litigation," 16 Computer & High Tech. L.J. 1 (Nov. 1999).

[v] Id.

[vi] 93 F.3d 1327 (7th Cir. 1996).

[vii] 112 F.3d 853 (7th Cir. 1997).

[viii] 814 F. Supp. 1186 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).

[ix] 914 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa. 1996).

[x] Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).

[xi] 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 2463 (6th Cir. 2002).

[xii] 955 F. Supp. 970 (N.D. Ill. 1997).

[xiii] 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20918 (D.D.C. 1999).

[xiv] ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 3.4(a) (2001). Most, if not all, states have codified the Model Rules as part of the state Code, although some with variations.

[xv] 593 F. Supp. 1443 (C.D. Cal. 1984).

[xvi] ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6 (2001).

[xvii] Fed. R. Civ. Proc. Rule 26(b)(3).

[xviii] 885 F. Supp. 672 (M.D. Pa. 1994).

[xix] Fed. R. Civ. Proc. Rule 26(b)(1).

[xx] ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 3.4(d) (2001).

[xxi] 995 F.2d 1376 (7th Cir. 1993).

[xxii] ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 5.3 (2001).

[xxiii] 167 F.R.D. 90 (D. Colo. 1996).

[xxiv] ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 3.4(d) (2001).

[xxv] 83 F.3d 526 (1st Cir.1996).

[xxvi] ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 3.2 (2001).

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