HIGHLIGHTS
FOR THE MONTH OF NOVEMBER 2007
By: Kraig
B. Long
Union's Loss Of Majority Support Found Where
Employees Sought Vote To Remove The Union
Payment Of Wages And Benefits For Sixty Days Following Plant Closure Satisfied WARN
Title VII Complaint Process
Personal Protective Equipment
NLRA Remedies
NLRA Retaliation
Attorney-Client Privilege
I-9 Update
Unusual Behavior May Signal Need For FMLA Leave
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Union's Loss Of Majority Support Found Where
Employees Sought Vote To Remove The Union
In Wurtland
Nursing & Rehabilitation Center, the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) reversed the administrative law judge's
decision and held that the employer did not violate the
National Labor Relations Act by unilaterally withdrawing
recognition from the Union as the employees' bargaining
representative.
In its decision, the Board recognized the general rule
that an employer may unilaterally withdraw recognition from
the Union when the Union has actually lost the support of
the majority of the bargaining unit employees. The Board
disagreed, however, with the ALJ's finding that an employee
petition containing more than 50 percent of the employees'
signatures in the unit and stating that the employees wished
"for a vote to remove the Union" failed to show that the
union lost the support of the majority of employees. The
Board found that a reasonable reading of the petition indicated
that the employees were rejecting union representation,
and not seeking simply a vote to determine whether to remove
the union. The Board distinguished petitions held to be
insufficient evidence of loss of majority support, where
employees were merely asking for a vote on union representation
without indicating how they would vote, such as where the
employees stated that their contract expired and "would
like to have a vote on whether to have a union or not" or
where the petition stated that it wants "to find out if
the majority of employees would like to vote on the union."
The Board held, in this case, that the employees' statement
that they wished "for a vote to remove the Union" was objective
proof of the employees' withdrawal of support for the Union,
and that the employees asked for a vote believing it was
a means to their desired end of removing the Union. In finding
that the employer established an actual loss of majority
support at the time it withdrew its recognition of the Union,
the Board emphasized that the evidence establishing loss
of the support of a majority of the unit employees does
not have to be "unambiguous." An employer may prove loss
of the majority by a preponderance of the evidence.
Payment Of Wages And Benefits For Sixty Days Following Plant Closure Satisfied WARN
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
recently held that an employer did not violate the Worker
Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (“WARN
Act”) when it ceased all operations at its plant without
prior notice of the shutdown, but thereafter, paid full
wages and benefits for the next sixty (60) days to all of
its employees who did not accept work with the successor
employer.
Facts of the Case: When employees
arrived at work on October 31, 2005, they discovered that
the employer had ceased all operations at the plant. The
employees received a memorandum advising that the plant
had been sold and that the employer would continue their
employment until the earlier of December 31, 2005, or the
date they accepted employment with the successor company.
Employees would not be required to report to work, and would
continue to receive their wages based on a forty-hour workweek
and would remain eligible for their benefits for the next
60 days, so long as they did not accept employment with
the successor company. The plaintiffs were 22 employees
who accepted full-time employment with the successor company
in late November 2005 and then stopped receiving their wages
and benefits as stated by the prior employer. The employees
sued, claiming that the employer violated the WARN Act when
it failed to give 60 days notice of the October 31 shutdown
and therefore should be required to continue paying their
wages and benefits for 60 days after October 31, regardless
of their employment with the successor company during that
period. The trial court rejected the employees’ claim
and found for the employer.
The Court’s Ruling:
In Long
v. Dunlop Sports Group Americas, Inc., the Fourth Circuit
agreed with the trial court. The Court rejected the employees’
argument that because they no longer worked at the plant
after the October 31 shutdown, they suffered an “employment
loss” at the time of the shutdown and were entitled
to notice 60 days prior thereto. The Court recognized that
the WARN Act requires that “[a]n employer shall not
order a plant closing or mass layoff [resulting in an employment
loss for 50 or more employees] until the end of a 60-day
period after the employer serves written notice of such
an order.” The Court, however, recognized that the
purpose of the notice requirement is fulfilled, and the
Act is not violated, when the employer agrees to pay employees
their full wages and benefits for a period of 60 days after
the plant closure or until the employees accept employment
with the successor company.
The Court explained that the required WARN Act notice must
precede the date when the employment loss resulting from
the plant shutdowns occurs, and need not coincide with the
date of the shutdown itself. Thus, the Court ruled that
the date of the “employment loss” resulting
from the plant closure in this case was December 31, when
the employer ceased paying its employees full wages and
benefits, and that the employer’s notice of the shutdown
at the time of the shutdown complied with the WARN Act.
As such, the Fourth Circuit held that the 22 employees did
not suffer an employment loss because they continued to
be paid and receive benefits until they voluntarily terminated
their employment to accept employment with the successor
company.
Lessons Learned: Employers
who fail to provide the statutory 60-day notice prior to
a mass layoff or facility closing affecting more than 50
employees should pay employees for a period of 60 days following
the announcement of the shutdown to satisfy the notice requirements.
As the Fourth Circuit noted in this case, the WARN Act protects
employees’ expectations of wages and benefits, not
their expectation of performing work.
TAKE NOTE
Title VII Complaint
Process. In
EEOC v. V&J Foods, Inc., the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit held that an employer’s complaint
process was too complicated for a teenage employee to understand,
and therefore, it was not unreasonable for the former teenage
employee to have failed to use it for her sexual harassment
complaints. The Court held that an employer’s complaint
procedure must take into account “the capabilities
of the class of employees in question” to be reasonable.
The Court held in this case that the employer’s complaint
mechanism was “likely to confuse event adult employees”
as it did not provide a clear path for complaints of harassment.
The Court commented specifically on the absence of a toll-free
number dedicated to receiving harassment and similar complaints.
Because it was part of the employer’s business plan
to hire teenagers, the Seventh Circuit held that the employer
was obligated to tailor its complaint procedures to the
understanding of an average teenager. While recognizing
that an employer is not required to tailor its complaint
procedures for each individual employee, the Seventh Circuit
confirmed that an employer must ensure that its procedures
are understandable to the average employee. Thus, if your
employees cannot speak English, then a complaint procedure
that is only in English would not be reasonable.
Personal Protective
Equipment. The Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA) announced a new
rule requiring employers to pay for almost all of the
OSHA-required personal protective equipment (PPE), including
replacement PPE. The final rule goes into effect
on February 13, 2008, and gives employers three months (until
May 2008) to comply. The new regulations provide
that employers must provide all PPE at no cost to full and
part-time employees. The rule does not create any new requirements
regarding what kinds of PPE that employers must provide.
The rule does not require employers to reimburse employees
who voluntarily choose to use PPE that they own. The rule
does not require employers to pay for items not used to
protect against hazards in the workplace, such as uniforms
or items worn to keep clean. The new rule provides further
that employers need not pay for replacement PPE instances
where the employee lost or intentionally damaged the equipment.
OSHA defines lost equipment to include even a single instance
where an employee fails to come to work with his PPE.
NLRA Remedies.
In Anheuser-Busch,
Inc., the National Labor Relations Board held that the
employer violated its duty to bargain when it installed
surveillance cameras without first notifying and bargaining
with the union, but that no make-whole remedy would be issued
for the 16 employees who were discharged or suspended for
misconduct captured by the cameras. In this case, the Board
held that installing the cameras was an unlawful unilateral
change under the NLRA, and issued a cease and desist order
against the employer. The Board held, however, that the
employer’s discovery of the misconduct through the
use of the surveillance cameras confirmed that the employer’s
discipline of the employees was for cause, thereby precluding
a Board make-whole remedy.
NLRA Retaliation.
In BE
& K Construction Co., the National Labor Relations
Board reversed its prior decision that an employer’s
filing and maintaining an unsuccessful lawsuit against charging
party unions established that the lawsuit was retaliatory
against the unions for engaging in protected concerted activity.
When the unions attempted to delay the employer’s
construction project by lobbying for the adoption and enforcement
of a baseless emissions standard; handbilling, picketing
and encouraging strikes without revealing the reasons for
their disagreement; and filing a lawsuit alleging a health
and safety code violation without regard to its merits,
the employer filed suit against the unions. The lawsuit
was ultimately dismissed by the trial court and the Ninth
Circuit. In light of the Ninth Circuit’s decision,
the Board initially concluded that the employer’s
lawsuit was unlawful based on Board precedent that if a
lawsuit “resulted in a judgment adverse to the plaintiff
[employer]” and was found to have been filed to retaliate
against the unions for engaging in protected activities,
the Board may find that the Act was violated. After remand
of the case from the Supreme Court invalidating the Board’s
standard that all reasonably based but unsuccessful lawsuits
could be determined to have been filed for retaliatory purposes,
the Board concluded that filing and maintaining a reasonably
based lawsuit does not constitute an unfair labor practice,
regardless of the motive for initiating the lawsuit. The
Board applied its new standard to both ongoing and completed
litigation, concluding that its holding was necessary to
protect the fundamental First Amendment right to petition.
Attorney-Client Privilege.
A New York court has recently bolstered the principle
that employees have no expectation of privacy in e-mail
correspondence when using their employer's e-mail system.
In Scott
v. Beth Israel Medical Center, the Court found that
an employee's use of his employer's e-mail system to communicate
with his attorney (regarding a dispute with the employer)
waived any privilege attached to those communications. The
Court based its ruling on several key points: the employer
had a policy, known to the employee, stating that use of
company email may only be for business purposes and that
any e-mail created, received, saved or sent on the employer’s
e-mail system belongs to the employer; and that the employee
has no personal privacy right in any of the material. The
court concluded the employee’s e-mails were not protected
by the attorney-client or work product privileges because
they were not made in confidence (a necessary component
of the privileges) given the forewarnings made to the employee,
who still chose to use the employer’s e-mail system
for communicating with his lawyer.
I-9 Update. Since
our November
13, 2007 E-Lert announcing that the U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration Services (USCIS) released a revised Form
I-9 and a related updated handbook for employers, the USCIS
has added a new document to the list of documents that an
employer may accept from newly hired employees during the
employment eligibility verification process. Employers may
now accept an Unexpired Employment Authorization Documents
(I-766) to establish both identity and employment eligibility.
While employers should immediately begin using the revised
Form I-9, the USCIS has indicated that it will eventually
publish a notice that provides employers with a 30-day transition
period to implement the new form. Employers can access the
revised Form I-9 at http://www.uscis.gov/i-9.
TOP TIP
Unusual Behavior May Signal Need For FMLA Leave
In Stevenson
v. Hyre Electric Co., the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit held that an otherwise model employee’s sudden
unusual behavior in the workplace may have been sufficient
notice to the employer that the employee suffered from a
serious health condition and needed leave under the FMLA.
The employee, who had no history of misconduct or serious
health problems, became very intimidating and belligerent
towards her co-workers and supervisors after a stray dog
climbed through a window in the warehouse where the employee
worked and approached her. The Court held that the employee’s
behavior was so unusual and bizarre that it put the employer
on constructive notice that the employee suffered from a
serious health condition and was in need of FMLA leave.
The Court noted the example of an employer observing an
employee break her arm and concluded that this observation
gives the employer notice of the need for FMLA leave without
the employee saying a word. Accordingly, the employee’s
termination for failing to appear for work following the
incident was unlawful because the employer should have known
that employee was in need of FMLA leave based on her behavior.
While this case presents a more extreme example of an employer
being on notice of the need of leave, without an employee
using “magic words” to invoke the protections
of the statute, it serves as a clear reminder that when
an employer has knowledge of facts or circumstances sufficient
to establish a probable basis for FMLA leave, it must proceed
with deference to the employee’s rights under the
FMLA. Employers must continue to be cognizant of any circumstances
that may suggest that an employee suffers from a serious
medical condition or is otherwise in need of FMLA leave,
even though the employee has not explicitly asked for or
communicated with words by the employee.
For greater clarification of any of these issues, you may
contact any Shawe
Rosenthal attorney.
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